ABSTRACT The Internet of Things (IoT) acts as an umbrella for the Internet-enabled devices for various applications, such as smart home, smart city, smart grid, and smart healthcare. The emergence of the immense economic potential necessitates a robust authentication mechanism that needs to be lightweight and suitable for real-time applications. Moreover, the physical integrity of these devices cannot be assumed as these are designed to be deployed in an unattended environment with minimum human supervision. A user authentication mechanism for the IoT, in addition to guaranteeing user anonymity and un-traceability functionality requirements, must also be resistant to device physical capture and related misuses. In this paper, we present a novel lightweight anonymous user authentication protocol for the IoT environment by utilizing ''cryptographic one-way hash function'', ''physically unclonable function (PUF)'' and ''bitwise exclusive-OR (XOR)'' operations. The broadly accepted Real-Or-Random (ROR) model-based formal security analysis, formal security verification using the automated software verification tool, namely ''automated validation of internet security protocols and applications (AVISPA)'' and also non-mathematical (informal) security analysis have been carried out on the proposed scheme. It is shown that the proposed scheme has the ability to resist various well-known attacks that are crucial for securing the IoT environment. Through a detailed comparative study, we show that the proposed scheme outperforms other existing related schemes in terms of computation and communication costs, and also security & functionality features. Finally, a practical demonstration of the proposed scheme using the NS3 simulation has been provided for measuring various network performance parameters.
I. INTRODUCTION
We are living in the age of information, and a significant portion of the information is derived from the innumerable The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Chao Shen.
Internet connected smart devices and sensors that make up the Internet of Things (IoT). It is projected that by the year 2020, the number of IoT devices will approach fifty billion [1] . This exponential growth in popularity of IoT devices, partly driven by the cultural shift of preference of smart (Internet enabled) consumer appliances, exposes a huge attack surface for the adversaries to exploit the information. Without adequate addressable of the concern regarding the security and privacy of the vast amount of sensitive data that is expected to flow through these IoT networks, popular consumer deployment of these technologies will be untenable [2] . The economic potential alone provides the impetus to develop robust authentication mechanism for IoT architecture. Fig. 1 describes a generalized IoT architecture.
The authors in [3] defined the objectives of IoT that bridges between the physical world and the computer-based systems unlocking great economic welfare, accuracy and efficiency with minimal human action. Through this definition IoT subsumes the wireless sensor networks (WSNs) domain. The authentication problem in IoT architecture is quite similar to the problems addressed for WSNs. Thus, the lessons learned for developing anonymous authentication schemes for WSNs carry over to the IoT architecture. However, one difference between a typical IoT device and a typical WSN sensor is that generally the IoT device is more complex and expensive. Consequently, it is quite conceivable that an IoT device can have replaceable subsystems. The current standard threat model (defined in Section I-B) ensures that the stolen credentials from one system cannot be utilized to compromise the security of unrelated devices. But, in light of reusable modular IoT devices, a new attack must also be considered, such as impersonation of compromised devices. An adversary can extract the credentials from a physically captured smart device and using these credentials the adversary can impersonate on behalf of the captured smart devices. As the users and gateway nodes will use the almost same credentials to verify the identity of the device, this impersonating device cannot be also detected. In this scenario, even if the rest of the network is not compromised, the user who connects to the spurious devices will expose him/herself to the adversary. To get around a similar problem of stolen user credentials, a widely accepted approach is to incorporate user biometric into the authentication scheme. Analogously, we need to employ some sort of device biometric. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) support such a functionality. In this paper, we present a novel physically secure lightweight anonymous authentication protocol for IoT using PUFs.
A. NETWORK MODEL
In this paper, we follow a similar network model to that presented in [4] and [5] . The IoT architecture is composed of disjoint sub-networks consisting of multiple IoT smart devices operating as sensors or actuators, that are connected over the public Internet. The smart devices are accessed through their respective gateway node (GWN ) over a heterogeneous network. The authorized users, prior to enjoying services of a smart device (SD), must register with the corresponding GWN . The registered mobile users (MU s) can mutually authenticate with a smart device SD through the GWN in order to negotiate a session key for accessing the device real-time data. A standard security requirement for authentication is that it must support anonymity and intractability for both MU and SD [3] .
B. THREAT MODEL
The authors in [3] defined the security requirements and also a threat model related to IoT ecosystems. In our work, we adhere to the broadly accepted Dolev-Yao (DY) threat model [6] . Under DY-threat model, an adversary A will have complete control over the communication media. Thus, A can eavesdrop upon, alter, delete and even forge messages that are transmitted through the communication media. Additionally, it is assumed that through power analysis attacks [7] , A can extract the sensitive data stored in a lost or stolen smart card. Furthermore, it is within A's capacity to physically capture some IoT smart devices as the IoT devices can be deployed in some unattended environment, such as in some IoT applications including healthcare and surveillance, and A can extract the credentials stored in those captured devices. We work under the assumption that the GWN s are be physically secured under locking systems and thus, the GWN s are considered to be trusted entities in the IoT environment [8] .
This proposed scheme is also based on the CK-adversary model [9] . The CK-adversary model is a more stronger threat model and it is considered as the current de facto standard in modeling key-exchange protocols [10] . Under the CK-adversary model, the adversary A, in addition to all capabilities of the adversary under the DY model, can compromise secure information like session state, private and session keys. Thus, the key-exchange protocols need to guarantee that in the event of ephemeral (short-term) secret leakage, the effect on the security of session keys established among the communicating entities in an authenticated key-exchange protocol should be minimal [11] .
C. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
The main contributions of the paper are listed below.
• A novel lightweight anonymous user authentication protocol has been designed for IoT environment, which relies on the lightweight operations like ''Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs)'', ''fuzzy extractor functions'', ''one-way hash functions'' and ''bitwise XOR operations''.
• In the proposed protocol, the physical security of the user's device (smart card) and IoT smart devices deployed in the hostile environment is assured.
• The proposed protocol offers various functionality features, such as ''password and biometric update'', ''pseudo-identity renewal'' and ''challenge-response renewal''. In addition, the proposed protocol also supports ''device enrollment'' through which the IoT smart devices can be deployed any time (during initial deployment or after initial deployment).
• A detailed security analysis using the formal security using the broadly-accepted ROR model [12] , formal security verification using the popular software-based AVISPA tool [13] and informal security analysis has been carried out to show the proposed protocol provides high security.
• A rigorous comparative analysis shows that the proposed protocol achieves better security along with more functionality features, and provides comparable communication & computational overheads as compared to those for the related existing schemes.
• The NS3 simulation [14] has been carried out to measure several important network performance parameters on the proposed protocol.
D. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The organization of the paper is as follows. We present the theoretical background relevant to the work in Section II. A short review of the relevant authentication schemes from the existing literature in presented in Section III. The proposed scheme is presented in IV with the detailed description of all the phases. In Section V, we provide the rigorous security analysis of the proposed scheme through the formal security analysis and verification using ROR model and AVISPA verification) tool and also the informal analysis. We then present a comparative study showcasing the strength of the proposed scheme in Section VI with related existing schemes. A simulation study for the practical impact of the proposed scheme through NS3 simulation is presented in Section VII. Finally, we draw the conclusions in Section VIII.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide a short description of the theoretical background that are essential in this paper.
A. ONE-WAY CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH FUNCTION
One-way hash functions are extensively applied for data integrity. Cryptographic one-way hash functions are designed in such a way that they should be highly sensitive to even slight perturbations to the input. For example, even for two very similar inputs with little difference, the outputs are produced in such a way that they cannot be correlated to each other. Formally, a ''collision-resistant one-way hash function'' can be defined as follows [8] . Definition 1: Let h: {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n denote a one-way hash function. Upon receiving a variable length input, h(·) gives a fixed-size length output of n bits, called the message digest or hash output. If Adv Hash A (t) is defined as an adversary A's advantage in detecting hash collision in runtime t, Adv Hash
], where Pr[X ] is the probability of a random event X , and x 1 & x 2 are strings that are randomly selected by A. An (φ, t)-adversary A attacking a hash collision of h(·) means that with maximum execution time t, Adv Hash A (t) ≤ φ.
B. PHYSICALLY UNCLONABLE FUNCTION
The Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are designed to map an input uniquely to an output based on the physical micro structure of a device. An input-output pair together is known as a challenge-response pair and it is unique to each individual PUF circuit. A PUF circuit must exhibit the following properties [15] :
• The PUF circuit must be easy to evaluate as well as to implement.
• The PUF circuit must be unclonable. As the output of PUF is dependent on the physical characteristics, any alteration to the system will change in the PUF output. It is further assumed that it is impossible to tamper the communication between PUF and its host device as in pointed out in [16] .
Definition 2: A PUF, say PUF 1 , is secure, if for two input challenges C 1 , C 2 ∈ {0, 1} k it produces output responses R 1 , R 2 ∈ {0, 1} k with at least d 1 variation, and for any two different PUFs (PUF 1 , PUF 2 ) an input challenge C 1 should produce distinct output responses R 1 , R 2 ∈ {0, 1} k with at least d 2 variation. In other words,
where ε is a negligibly small value, C 1 and C 2 are challenges randomly selected by A, HD defines the Hamming distance, and d 1 and d 2 are the error tolerance thresholds for PUF.
C. FUZZY EXTRACTOR
Even though now-a-days a PUF circuits can be developed with a high degree of reliability, noise in PUF remains an important issue. Zhang et al. [17] investigated dissipative filtering issue for ''a class of discrete-time switched fuzzy systems with missing measurements''. They formulated the occurrence of missing measurements by representing it as a random variable that follows the ''Bernoulli binary distribution''. They also pointed out that it characterizes the effect of data loss in information transmission among the fuzzy plant and the filter.
Gope et al. [18] recommended the fuzzy extractor method [19] . The fuzzy extractor is compromised of two methods, namely 1) probabilistic generation function Gen(·) and 2) deterministic re-production function Rep(·), that are defined below.
• Gen: For a challenge-response pair, say PUF(C i ) = Res i , Gen(·) outputs a tuple comprising of a (secret) key R i and helper data hd i , that is, Gen(Res i ) = (R i , hd i ).
• Rep: Given a PUF 
III. LITERATURE SURVEY
Lamport [21] introduced a seminal on remote user authentication in 1981. Later, in the works by several other authors in [22] - [24] the concepts of mutual authentication, smart-card based authentication, user anonymity were introduced, which became the standard requirements for later authentication schemes. Wong et al. [25] proposed a hash-based lightweight user authentication scheme for the resource-constrained wireless sensor networks (WSNs). Das [26] presented an authentication scheme for the resource-constrained WSNs. However, the schemes [25] , [26] were vulnerable to several attacks as identified and improved upon by the authors in [27] - [29] .
Madhusudan and Mittal [30] identified that user anonymity is one of the ten desirable attributes for an ideal password authentication scheme. Turkanović et al. [31] discussed WSN as a component of IoT, and pointed out that user anonymity and un-traceability are the widely considered integral requirements for authentication schemes in WSN. Alqasen [32] concluded that owing to the diverse and heterogeneous nature of IoT, specific investigation into the security challenges for IoT architecture is also necessary.
Granjal et al. [33] identified ''privacy, anonymity, liability and trust'' as fundamental for the social acceptance of most of the future IoT applications. Mineraud et al. [34] analyzed malwares and highlighted inherent design flaws in the emerging IoT infrastructure and its associated security challenges. Makhdoom et al. [35] , while discussing the threats to IoT, identified that user anonymity vis-a-vis id management as the key security and privacy challenges. Thus, user anonymity and un-traceability are necessary requirements for designing an authentication scheme for IoT environment.
Jeong et al. [36] proposed a ''One-Time Password (OTP)'' based approach for user authentication in smart home environment. Unfortunately, this scheme fails to assure mutual authentication, user anonymity and untracability. Hunumanathappa and Singh [37] also presented a pass-phrase based approach to ensure device attestation during user authentication for ubiquitous computing devices.
Santoso and Vun [38] proposed a user authentication scheme for smart homes using ''Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)'' technique. However, this scheme fails in ensuring anonymity and untracability [8] . Porambage et al. [39] designed a scalable authentication protocol suitable for heterogeneous resource-constrained WSNs. Turkanović et al. [31] also presented a computationally efficient scheme for authentication in WSNs. Chang and Le [40] proposed two schemes for user authentication: 1) the first one is based on bitwise XOR and hash operations, and 2) the second scheme additionally uses ECC apart from bitwise XOR and hash operations to provide high security. Unfortunately, Das et al. [41] demonstrated that both the schemes were vulnerable to several known attacks, including man-in-themiddle, offline password guessing and replay attacks. Wazid et al. [5] also observed that the scheme [31] was vulnerable to known attacks like privileged insider, offline password guessing, user impersonation. They proposed a lightweight authenticated key management protocol for a generic IoT network.
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Jie et al. [42] proposed an RFID based multi-layer architecture for smart homes. Song et al. [43] studied [42] and observed the certificate authority in smart devices were too computationally expensive for practical applications. As an alternative, they presented an authentication scheme based on hash functions and chaotic systems. Challa et al. [4] designed an authentication scheme intended for IoT deployment applying ECC signatures. Gope and Hwang [44] presented another lightweight scheme for user authentication in real-time WSN. However, their scheme does not support sensor node anonymity.
Shen et al. [45] investigated importance of reliability and applicability of using motion-sensor behavior in the domains of active and continuous smartphone authentication across different operational scenarios. They also presented a methodical assessment of ''distinctiveness'' and ''permanence'' properties of the behavior. Shen et al. [46] designed another authentication protocol using motion sensors (gyroscope and accelerometer) that are embedded in the smartphones. The main feature of their mechanism is that it accomplishes authentication process constantly and completely by monitoring the user daily tasks.
Amin et al. [47] presented a user authentication protocol for distributed cloud computing environment composed of IoT devices. However, Challa et al. [48] and Li et al. [49] demonstrated several security pitfalls in the scheme [47] , such as privileged-insider and impersonation attacks. Apart from these, Amin et al.'s scheme [47] fails to guarantee some important requirements like user anonymity and forward secrecy properties.
Dhillon and Kalra [50] presented a multi-factor remote user authentication scheme for IoT environment. Chuang et al. [51] classified continuous authentication protocols for IoT into user-to-device model and device-to-device model, and presented a lightweight continuous authentication protocol for device-to-device authentication in IoT. Unfortunately, the schemes of Dhillon and Kalra [50] and Chuang et al. [51] fail to provide user and sensing device anonymity, respectively, and both the schemes also fail to satisfy untraceability property.
Zhou et al. [52] proposed an anonymous authentication scheme using only hash function and XOR operations. Unfortunately, their scheme is vulnerable to replay attack, and it also fails to preserve forward secrecy goal. Ferrag et al. [53] presented a detailed survey on various authentication schemes including user authentication for IoT. In addition to the individual vulnerabilities, all the discussed schemes fail to prevent impersonation of compromised smart devices (sensor nodes) using the extracted credentials.
Gope et al. [15] used physically unclonable function (PUF) to physically secure sensor nodes in industrial wireless sensor networks. Devadas et al. [16] proposed PUF-based RFID integrated circuits for anti-counterfeiting application. Since then PUFs have been widely used in securing RFID systems. Gope et al. [18] discussed the issue of noise in PUF output and its implication on authentication schemes. They utilized fuzzy extractor technique [19] to circumvent this issue. Additionally, their scheme has high communication overhead, and it is only secure under the DY threat model and cannot resist ephemeral secret leakage attack under the current CK-adversary model (discussed in the threat model in Section I-B).
Most of the existing schemes proposed in the literature for the IoT and related environment are either insecure against various known attacks or they are inefficient in communication and computation. In this article, we aim to propose a novel secure lightweight anonymous authentication protocol for IoT environment using PUFs that can prevent impersonation of compromised smart devices in addition to resisting other well-known attacks needed for IoT security in order to eradicate the flaws in the existing user authentication mechanisms. The scheme proposed by Gope et al. [15] only provides user authentication mechanism in the existing literature that resists impersonation of compromised smart devices. However, the scheme proposed in this article outperforms the existing schemes including the recently proposed scheme [15] in terms of computational as well communication overheads. Furthermore, unlike the scheme proposed in [15] , our proposed scheme resists ''Ephemeral Secret Leakage (ESL)'' attack (discussed in Section V-C.4) in the presence of an CK-adversary [9] (as discussed in the threat model in Section I-B). In Section VI, we also present a more comprehensive study showcasing the strength of the proposed scheme with other related existing state-of-art user authentication schemes.
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we present our proposed scheme that is a physically secure lightweight user authentication scheme in the IoT environment based on PUFs. The proposed scheme is divided into five distinct phases, namely 1) setup, 2) device enrollment, 3) user registration, 4) mutual authentication and session key agreement, and 5) maintenance. In Table 1 , we define the important notations and their significance that are used in the proposed scheme. The detailed description of all the phases related to the proposed scheme is provided in the following subsections.
A. SETUP PHASE
During the setup phase, the gateway node (GWN ) defines the system parameters: a collision-resistant cryptographic one way hash function h(·), a physically unclonable function PUF(·), and the fuzzy extractor generator and reproduction functions Gen(·) and Rep(·). The GWN selects a prime field Z p and also generates a long term secret key LTS ∈ Z p . After the setup, the system is ready for operations like device enrollment, user registration and other phases.
B. DEVICE ENROLLMENT PHASE
The IoT smart devices can be dynamically enrolled into the system in offline mode anytime after setup through the steps described below.
• Step 1. The GWN defines the identity ID d of each smart device SD. The GWN then generates C d , a set of n random challenges to be used during authentication for SD, where
The sets R d and hd d are then calculated by passing Res d through the fuzzy generator function Gen(·), where
• Step 3. The GWN stores the credentials 1 Additional random challenges are unnecessary in order to handle the issue of desynchronization or denial of service (DoS) attack as described in [15] , because our proposed scheme does not require synchronization between the GWN and the smart devices. 
C. USER REGISTRATION PHASE
The users can register into the system anytime after the above setup phase in offline mode through secure channel with the following steps.
• Step 1. A user U picks his/her identity ID u and sends it as the registration request message to the gateway node GWN through a secure channel.
• Step 2. On receiving the registration request, the GWN computes k u pre = h(ID u LTS) using the user U 's identity ID u and its long term secret key LTS, and also generates a dynamic identity DID d for the U . Additionally, to handle the issue of desynchronization or DoS attack as described in [15] , the GWN generates PID d = {pid 0 , · · · , pid s } as a set of unlinkable pseudo-identities for the user U . Finally, the GWN issues a smart card SC u containing the information DID u , k u pre , PID u and the system parameters param = {h(·), PUF(·), Gen(·), Rep(·), et, Z p } for the user U through a secure channel.
• Step 3. On receiving the smart card SC u , the user U selects his/her password PW u and imprints the biometric β u , and calculates γ u = PUF(β u ). Using the fuzzy generator function Gen(·), the smart card SC u generates the biometric token α u and the corresponding reproduction parameter hd u . Next, SC u calculates IPB = h(ID u α u PW u ) and saves it in its memory. SC u also encrypts hd u as hd and PID * u , respectively to complete the user registration process.
The summary of the user registration procedure has been presented in Figure 3 .
D. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND SESSION KEY AGREEMENT PHASE
A registered user U can access an enrolled smart device SD using the following steps described below. In this phase, both the user U and smart device SD can mutually authenticate in presence of the GWN and also negotiate a session key SK .
• Step 1. The user U provides his/he identity ID u , password PW u and imprints biometric β u at the sensor of a specific terminal. The smart card SC u then decrypts the biometric reproduction parameter hd u from hd * u using ID u and PW u . By passing β u and hd u to the fuzzy reproduction function Rep(·), SC u reconstructs the biometric token α u . SC u then calculates IPB = h(ID u α u PW u ). If IPB = IPB , the login attempt will fail. Oth- 
, and then checks Auth g against the received Auth g . If these match, the SD selects a random nonce k d ∈ Z p from which the short term key The mutual authentication and session key agreement procedure has been summarized in Figure 4 .
Remark 1: If the gateway node GWN fails to find DID u in its database, it will reject the authentication request. This can occur in case of desynchronization between the GWN and a user U . In this case, the user U can reattempt with a pseudo-identity pid i ∈ PID u . Of course, once it is successfully authenticated with pid i , the GWN and U will be resynchronized, and U can use DID u as normal for subsequent authentication sessions. Additionally, if the check Auth d = h(SK R d i ) fails, U should realize that the synchronization between the GWN and U has been lost, and he/she should use a pseudo-identity for the next authentication request. Note that that the pseudo-identity pid i is valid for a single use and must be purged from PID u after use.
E. MAINTENANCE PHASE
In this section, we describe the auxiliary procedures that are necessary for uninterrupted long-term operation of the scheme.
1) PASSWORD AND BIOMETRIC UPDATE PHASE
The procedure for updating the password and biometric information of a legal registered user U under the proposed scheme is discussed in this section.
The user U first logs into the system as described in Section IV-D using Step its memory. It is worth noticing that this phase is completely executed locally without further involving the GWN .
SC u recalculates IPB new
The password and biometric update procedure has been summarized in Figure 5 .
2) PSEUDO IDENTITY RENEWAL PHASE
As noted in Remark 1, the user U utilizes pid i ∈ PID d to authenticate in case of desyncronization with the GWN . The set PID d is finite and will eventually get exhausted. Before this happens, the user U must acquire additional pseudo identities. The following steps are essential to achieve this goal.
• Step 1. The user U logs into the system as described in Section IV-D (see Step 1) , and other steps that are very similar. U then composes the message M pid 1 = DID u , Q ug , Auth u which is sent to the gateway node GWN via open channel.
• Figure 6 .
3) CHALLENGE RESPONSE RENEWAL PHASE
The challenge response pairs (
for mutual authentication between a smart device SD and gateway node GWN are finite and will also eventually get exhausted. Before this situation occurs, the gateway node GW must acquire additional challenge response pairs for future operation. The steps involved in this process are described below.
• Step 1. The GWN looks up for a challenge response pair (
as a set of another n random challenges 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Wang et al. [54] made some important observations on security-related issues while analyzing several existing authentication protocols in the literature. They found that VOLUME 7, 2019 attaining the soundness of authentication protocols is still an open problem. They noticed that the standard model-based formal security analysis can not capture some structural mistakes while proving the security of a protocol. Hence, it is extremely essential to design and analyze the authentication protocols which should provide high security. Due to this reason, other methods such as ''formal security analysis using the Real-Or-Random (RoR) model [12] , formal security verification using AVISPA tool [13] and also informal security analysis'' are essential to assure that the design authentication protocol to be secure with high probability.
In Section V-A, we utilize the broadly-accepted ROR model [12] to formally analyze the security of the proposed scheme. In Section V-B, through the formal security verification using AVISPA simulation tool [13] we verify that the proposed scheme is free from man-in-the-middle and replay attacks. Additionally, in Section V-C, we also informally demonstrate that the proposed scheme is also secure against various other well-known attacks.
A. FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS THROUGH REAL-OR-RANDOM MODEL
In this section, we describe the Real-Or-Random (ROR) model proposed in [12] , and then utilize it for formal security analysis.
1) PARTICIPANTS
Let π u U , π g GWN and π d SD denote the u th , g th and d th instances corresponding to a user U , gateway node GWN and smart device SD, respectively. These are also called oracles [8] , [40] .
2) PARTNERING
Two instances π u U and π d SD are said to be partnered if and only if the following ''two conditions are fulfilled simultaneously: 1) the communication session id sid is common between them and 2) partial transcript of all message exchanged between them are unique''.
3) FRESHNESS
π u U and π d SD are fresh provided that the session key SK between U and SD has not been divulged to an adversary A.
4) ADVERSARY
Under the ROR model, the adversary A is assumed have a complete control over the communication channel. Consequently, A can eavesdrop, alter, delete and even insert fabricated messages during communication. Additionally, the adversary A can execute the following queries.
• Execute(π u , π d ): By execution of this query, A can intercept all the transmitted messages among U , GWN and SD. Due to intercepting nature, an eavesdropping attack is modeled under this query.
• Send(π d , m): Execution of this query enables A to send a message, say msg to its participating instance π d , and also to receive a response message in reply. This query is treated as an active attack.
• CorruptSC(π u ): By executing this query, A can learn the credentials {IPB, DID * u , k * u pre
, and hd * u } stored in a legal user U 's stolen or lost smart card, SC u .
• CorruptSD(π d ): By executing this query, A can extract the credentials {ID d , hd d i } from a captured IoT sensing device SD. It is also assumed that the queries CorruptSC and CorruptSD provide the weak corruption model [40] . Consequently, a participant instance's short-term keys and the internal data are not corrupted.
• Test(π u , π d ): This query determines the semantic security of the established session key SK between U and SD following the indistinguishability in the ROR model [12] . At first A preforms an unbiased coin toss c. The outcome of this coin toss decides the result of the Test query. If SK is fresh, π u or π d produces SK upon the satisfaction of the condition c = 1 or a random number for the fulfillment of the condition c = 0. In all other cases, it returns a null value.
5) SEMANTIC SECURITY OF SESSION KEY
According to the ROR model, A must distinguish between an instance's actual session key and a random key. A can perform the repeated number of Test(·) queries to π u or π d , and saves the result of Test into bit b. A wins the game if b = b , where b is a randomly guessed bit. The advantage of A in breaking the semantic security of the proposed authenticated key agreement (AKE), say P in time t is defined as Adv AKE P,A (t) = |2.Pr[SUCCESS] − 1|, where SUCCESS represents an event such that A wins the game.
6) RANDOM ORACLE
All communicating entities in the proposed scheme including A will have access to the secure PUF, PUF(·) as well as a collision resistant hash function, h(·). Both are modeled as random oracles, say HO.
7) SECURITY PROOF
By utilizing the definition of the secure PUF and the collision-resistant hash function from Section II, and acknowledging that passwords obey Zipf's law [55] and the above described ROR model, Theorem 1 provides the semantic security of the proposed scheme.
Theorem 1: Let A be a polynomial time adversary running against the proposed scheme P under the ROR model, in which user-chosen passwords follow the Zipf's law [55] , and l 1 and l 2 denote the number of bits in the biometric secret key α u and the secret user identity ID u , respectively. If Adv AKE P,A denotes A's advantage in breaking P's semantic security in order to derive the session key between a legal registered user U and an accessed IoT sensing device SD, then
where q h , q P and q s are the number of hash, PUF and Send queries, respectively, |Hash| and |PUF| define the range spaces of h(·) and PUF(·), respectively, and C and s are the Zipf's parameters [55] . Proof: We follow our proof analogous to the proof that presented in [15] , [56] , and [57] . G 0 -G 4 are the five sequential games are defined. The event SUCCESS i denotes that the adversary A can successfully guess the bit c in the game G j , j ∈ [0, 4]. The games are described in detailed as follows.
• Game G 0 : This game corresponds to an actual (real) attack on the proposed scheme, P by A. Since bit c is guessed at the beginning of G 0 , it is follows that
• 
is the established session key between a user U and a smart device SD. To compute SK , A requires the parallel knowledge of short term secrets (k u1 and k d ) as well as long term secrets (ID u and ID d ). As these values are unknown to A, only the intended user U and smart device SD can compute SK . Therefore, A's probability of wining the game G 1 is not increased through an eavesdropping attack. Consequently, we have the following result:
• Game G 2 : Under this game, the Send and hash queries are simulated. This game is modeled as an active attack, where A can attempt to fool a legitimate participant into accepting a modified message. A is permitted to make repeated queries to the random oracles to examine the presence of hash collisions. However, since all the messages M 1 , M 2 and M 3 contain random nonces, no hash coalition occurs when A queries the Send oracle with the help of h(·). It is worth noticing that both the games G 1 and G 2 are ''indistinguishable'' except the Send and hash queries are simulated in G 2 . Thus, by using the birthday paradox results, we have
• Game G 3 : This game is as an extension to G 2 where the simulation of PUF queries are included in this game. Using analogous argument provided in G 2 , the secure PUF(·) function property (discussed in Section II-B) gives the following result: , respectively [58] . In addition, A can leverage the Zipf's law on passwords [55] to guess the passwords. If we just consider trawling guessing attacks, the advantage of A will be over 0.5 when q s = 10 7 or 10 8 [55] . Furthermore, if we account for targeted guessing attacks where A can utilize the target user's personal information, A will have an advantage over 0.5 when q s ≤ 10 6 [55] . In practice, arbitrarily many wrong password attempts are not permitted in the system. In the absence of guessing attacks, both the games G 3 and G 4 are identical. Thus, we have following result [56] :
Finally, to win the game G 4 , A needs to guess bit b after querying the Test oracle. Thus, it is clear that
From Eqs. (1), (2) and (6), we have
Applying the triangular inequality and using Eqs. (3), (4) and (5), we obtain
Finally, by solving Eqs. (7) and (8), we obtain the required result:
B. FORMAL SECURITY VERIFICATION THROUGH AVISPA SIMULATION
In this section, we perform the formal security verification on the proposed scheme using the broadly-accepted AVISPA tool [13] . AVISPA is a push button tool for the automated validation of security protocols. AVISPA implements the Dolev-Yao (DY) threat model [6] to test if a security protocol is safe or unsafe against replay & man-in-the-middle attacks. The security protocol to be analyzed in AVISPA requires to be implemented under the role-oriented language, known as ''High Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL)'' [59] . A built-in translator, called HLPSL2IF, converts HLPSL code to the ''Intermediate Format (IF)''. The IF is then passed into one of the four available backends for AVISPA to produce the ''Output Format (OF)''.
The four backends in AVISPA are as follows [13] :
• The first backend is ''On-the-fly Model-Checker (OFMC) that does several symbolic techniques to explore the state space in a demand-driven way''.
• The second backend is the ''CL-AtSe (ConstraintLogic-based Attack Searcher) that provides a translation from any security protocol specification written as transition relation in intermediate format into a set of constraints which are effectively used to find whether there are attacks on protocols''.
• The third backend is the ''SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) that builds a propositional formula which is then fed to a state-of-the-art SAT solver and any model found is translated back into an attack''.
• The fourth backend is the ''TA4SP (Tree Automata based on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Security Protocols) that approximates the intruder knowledge by using regular tree languages''. The OF has various sections as described below [13] .
• SUMMARY: It mentions ''whether the tested protocol is safe, unsafe, or whether the analysis is inconclusive''.
• DETAILS: It tells ''a detailed explanation of why the tested protocol is concluded as safe, or under what conditions the test application or protocol is exploitable using an attack, or why the analysis is inconclusive''.
• PROTOCOL: This defines the ''HLPSL specification of the target protocol in IF''.
• GOAL: It is ''the goal of the analysis which is being performed by AVISPA using HLPSL specification''.
• BACKEND: It provides ''the name of the back-end that is used for the analysis, that is, one of OFMC, CL-AtSe, SATMC and TA4SP''.
• Final section includes ''the trace of a possible vulnerability to the target protocol, if any, along with some useful statistics and relevant comments''. More details regarding AVISPA and HLPSL can be found in [13] .
The user registration, device enrollment, login & authentication phases for the proposed scheme are implemented in HLPSL. In our implementation, three basic roles for a user U , the GWN and a smart device SD are defined in HLPSL. The compulsory roles for the session and goal & environment are also defined in HLPSL.
We then evaluate the proposed scheme against replay and man-in-the-middle attacks under the popular backends, OFMC and CL-AtSe using the SPAN, the Security Protocol ANimator for AVISPA tool [60] . There are three verifications associated with the testing of the proposed scheme [13] : 1) ''executability checking on non-trivial HLPSL specifications''; 2) ''replay attack checking''; and 3) ''Dolev-Yao (DY) model checking'' [6] . The first one is essential for assuring that the proposed protocol should reach to a state where a possible attack can be found while executing the protocol. Our HLPSL implentation assures that the proposed protocol was translated to HLPSL specification, which satisfied the design citeria (goals) for achieving the executability checking. The simulation was carried out for the execution tests with ''a bounded number of sessions''. For replay attack checking on the proposed protocol, both the considered backends (OFMC as well as CL-AtSe) check whether any the authorized agents can execute the specified protocol by searching a passive intruder. These back-ends have the ability to give the intruder (i) about the knowledge of some normal sessions between the legitimate agents. In addition, both OFMC & CL-AtSe backends can verify whether there is any man-in-the-middle attack mounted by i for the DY model checking. Fig. 8 presenting the simulation results show that the proposed scheme is secure against replay & man-in-the middle attacks.
C. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, through informal security analysis, we demonstrate the security features of the proposed scheme as well as its resilience against well-known attacks.
1) ATTAINMENT OF MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
In the proposed authentication scheme, during the authentication phase the GWN establishes trust in the authenticity of U if it can look up its identity ID u from its memory using the received DID u . The check on Auth u ensures the integrity of the received message. SD on receiving the 
Thus, mutual authentication between the user U and the smart device SD is attained in the proposed scheme.
2) ATTAINMENT OF ANONYMITY AND UNTRACEABILITY
An eavesdropping adversary A can monitor the messages M 1 , M 2 and M 3 . However, none of these eavesdropped messages contain any identifying information for user or smart device in plaintext formats. Thus, the proposed scheme provides both user and smart device anonymity. Moreover, all of these messages are composed using the random nonces and long-term secrets, and thus, these are dynamic in nature across different authentication sessions. Therefore, it is infeasible for A to trace both the user and smart device across sessions. Thus, the proposed scheme preserves the ''untraceability property'' for user and smart device.
3) ATTAINMENT OF FORWARD AND BACKWARD SECRECY
Assuming that A can some how learn the session key SK along with all its contributing secret values k u 1 , ID u , k d , ID d and R d i under the CK-adversary model (as discussed in the threat model in Section I-B). All other values are for single use, and therefore, compromise of a particular session will not compromise the session keys of any sessions previously established or to be established in future. Thus, the proposed scheme ensures ''forward and backward secrecy''.
4) RESILIENCE AGAINST EPHEMERAL SECRET LEAKAGE (ESL) ATTACK
In the proposed scheme, both a user U and a smart device SD establish a common session key SK = h(k du k ud R d i ) during the execution of login & authentication phase, where k ud is a secret comprising of a short term secret k u 1 and long term secret ID u . Similarly, k du is another secret comprising of a short term secret k d and long term secret ID d , and R d i is a long term single use secret.
The security of the session key SK is then based on the following two cases:
• Case 1. Assume that A has the short term secret credentials k u 1 and k d . Then, it is computationally infeasible for A to calculate the session key SK without knowledge of the long term secret credentials.
• Case 2. If some or all of the long term secrets ID u , ID d and R d i are revealed to A, it is also computationally infeasible for A to calculate SK without short term secrets k u 1 and k d . Thus, A can derive the valid session key SK only if both short and long term secrets are exposed at once. Hence, it is evident that the proposed scheme is resilient against ''ESL attack''.
5) RESILIENCE AGAINST IMPERSONATION ATTACKS
Assume that an adversary A attempts to impersonate a legitimate user U . As the pre-shared dynamic identity DID U 
he or she cannot compose a consistent M 3 . Thus, the proposed scheme is resistant against ''impersonation attacks''.
6) RESILIENCE AGAINST STOLEN SMART CARD AND OFFLINE GUESSING ATTACKS
Assume that an adversary A extracts the secret credentials from a lost or stolen SC i of a registered user U through power analysis attacks [7] . Then, A will have the credentials IPB, DID * u , k * u pre and hd * u . But, as all of these values are secured with the secret identity ID u , password PW u and the biometric key α u , A needs simultaneous guessing of all three factors to compromise the security of the proposed scheme. Thus, it becomes a computationally infeasible problem for A, and as a result, the proposed scheme is secure against ''offline guessing attacks in conjunction with the stolen smart card attack''.
7) RESILIENCE AGAINST PRIVILEGED-INSIDER ATTACK
An adversary A, who acts as a privileged-insider user of the GWN , can intercept the initial registration request information ID u . Also, none of the authentication messages contains any value dependent on the secrecy of ID u . Additionally, assuming that the privileged adversary attempts the previously discussed offline guessing attack with a stolen smart card, he or she will still need to simultaneously guess password PW u and biometric key α u . It is then a computationally infeasible task for A too. Thus, the proposed scheme is secure against ''privileged-insider attack''.
8) RESILIENCE AGAINST PHYSICAL CAPTURE OF SMART DEVICE
Suppose A can physically capture some smart devices. Then, A can extract all the secret credentials from the memory of a physically captured smart device SD compromising of the information {ID d , C d , hd d } from SD's memory. However, as ID d and {C d } are generated randomly, these are distinct and independent for all deployed smart devices. Hence, the compromised information do not help in computing the session keys among a user U and other non-compromised sensing devices SD . Additionally, due to 
VI. COMPARATIVE STUDY
In this section, we preform a detailed comparative study of the proposed scheme in terms of ''security & functionality features, communication and computational overheads'' with other existing related schemes, such as the schemes proposed by Gope et al. [15] , Zhou et al. [52] , Wazid et al. [5] and Chang and Le [40] . For the scheme [40] , we consider its ECC-based version as it is more secure than its basic version.
A. COMPUTATION COSTS COMPARISON
We use the notations T E s , T m , T f and T h to denote the time needed for computing symmetric encryption/decryption, elliptic curve point (scalar) multiplication, fuzzy extractor operation and hash operation, respectively. Based on experimental results reported in [61] and [62] , we have T E s ≈ 8.7, T m ≈ 63.075, T f ≈ T m = 63.075 and T h ≈ 0.5 milliseconds, respectively.
In the proposed scheme, during the login and authentication process, the user U , the GWN and the smart device SD need to perform 17T h + T f , 8T h and 6 T h + T f operations, respectively. Thus, the total computation cost is 31T h + 2T f , that requires approximately 141.65 ms. Table 2 summarizes the computational cost for the compared schemes. It is clear that the proposed scheme has a much lower computational overhead as compared to that for other schemes 2 with the exception of the schemes [44] , [52] . However, both the schemes [44] , [52] are two-factor authentication schemes with poor security & functionality features (see Table 4 ) and higher communication overhead (see Table 3 ). 2 It should be noted that the scheme in [15] , as presented by Gope et al., assumes ideal PUFs. But, all other schemes account for noisy PUF/biometric for the sake of fairness. We have assumed that all PUFs and biometric are processed through corresponding fuzzy extractor. The values reported in Table 2 are account for use of fuzzy extractor. 
B. COMMUNICATION COSTS COMPARISON
In order to compute the communication overheads of the different schemes, we assume that the hash digest (assuming SHA-1 hash algorithm [63] ) and identity to be 160 bits each, random nonce and PUF challenge response pair each to be 128 bits long. For other schemes, we additionally assume the timestamp to be 32 bits long, ECC point to be 320 bits and a ciphertext block (assuming Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-128) symmetric encryption) to be 128 bits.
In the proposed scheme, three exchanged messages
, Auth d require (160 + 160 + 160 + 160 + 160) = 800 bits, (128 + 160 + 160 + 160) = 608 bits and (160 + 160 + 160 + 160) = 640 bits during the time of the login and authentication phase. The total communication overhead of the proposed scheme is then (800 + 608 + 640) = 2048 bits, that is, 256 bytes. In Table 3 , we summarize the communication costs as well as the number of messages exchanged for the proposed schemes and compared schemes. We can observe that the proposed scheme commends the lowest communication overhead as compared to that for the other schemes. Table 4 tabulates the ''security & functionality features'' of the proposed scheme and other existing schemes. It is apparent that the proposed scheme offers superior ''security and more functionality features'' as compared to other compared schemes. The schemes proposed in [15] and [5] , while these are closed in terms of functionally & security features, the scheme [15] achieves these at much higher computation and communication overheads. Additionally, the scheme [15] fails to resist ESL attack under the CK adversary model. On the other hand, the scheme [5] requires clock synchronization and it provides no resolution for device impersonation attack.
C. SECURITY AND FUNCTIONALITY FEATURES COMPARISON

VII. PRACTICAL IMPACT STUDY
In this section, through a simulation study using the widely accepted NS3 (3.28) simulator [14], we measure the impact of the proposed scheme on various network performance parameters, such as ''network throughput (in bytes per second)'', ''end-to-end delay (in seconds)'' and ''packet loss rate (in number of lost packets per seconds)''.
We ran several simulations, with different number of users and smart devices for each. We simulated a single fixed access point which operated as the gateway node. The smart devices was radially scattered along a ring (inner radius 20 m and outer radius 100 m) centered on the gateway node GWN . The users were permitted to move freely (and randomly) across a square area of side 150 m and centered on the GWN . All the nodes communicate over 2.4 GHz IEEE 802.11 wi-fi standard. Additional details about the simulations are tabulated in Table 5 . Any details that are not explicitly mentioned mean that those are assumed with the default values as specified by NS3 (3.28) simulator.
A. IMPACT ON NETWORK THROUGHPUT
In Figure 9 , we plot the network throughput along the y-axis and different scenarios are along with the x-axis. The throughput is calculated by the expression (ν r × |ρ|)/T δ , where T δ , ν r and |ρ| represent the total time in seconds, the number of received packets and its size, respectively. Form Figure 9 , we observed that the network throughput increases with the number of messages exchanged.
B. IMPACT ON END-TO-END DELAY
In Figure 10 , we plot the end-to-end delay (eed) along the y-axis and different scenarios along the x-axis. The eed is VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 10. End-to-end delay in seconds. formulated by the expression
where ν p , T rcv i and T snd i represent the total number of packets, the time needed for receiving and sending a data packet i, respectively. We also observe that the end-to-end delay increases with the number of transmitted messages. This can be attributed to the increased number of messages contributing to the network congestion.
C. IMPACT ON PACKET LOSS RATE
In Figure 11 , we plot the packet loss rate (plr) along the y-axis and different scenarios along the x-axis. The plr can be estimated by the expression (ν t − ν r )/T δ , where ν t and ν r represent the total number of packets transmitted and received, respectively, and T δ represents the total time in seconds. As discussed previously this is the result of an increased number of messages contributing to the network congestion.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we discussed the necessity of designing a physically secure user authentication scheme for IoT environment. As a solution to the raised problem, we presented a novel physically secure lightweight anonymous user authentication protocol for IoT using physically unclonable functions. Through the rigorous analysis using the ROR model, formal security verification under AVISPA tool and informal security analysis, we demonstrated the security & functionality features of the proposed scheme. We also evaluated the practical impact of the proposed scheme using NS3 simulation and presented a comparative summary to demonstrate its potential to be deployed in a real-world environment. He is currently a Professor with the School of Electronics Engineering, Kyungpook National University. His research interests include computer networks, multimedia, and information security.
